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1 Introduction
Over the last few years since the financial crash in 2008, it has become clear that thestructure of  financial markets is a major threat for financial stability and wealth, and
this not just for countries as diverse as Austria (with its extensive exposure to Central and
Southern Eastern European countries), Cyprus, Iceland, Sweden (with a banking crisis in
the early 1990s), or the UK, where the financial sector has grown to a proportion of  the
gross domestic product that could only too easily bring down these economies entirely, not
to mention the global effects that could occur in a worst case scenario. Throughout the
most developed countries modern finance has become a too complex system with a huge
variety of  financial institutions which no longer only perform services of  financial
intermediation in terms of  classical banking definitions. Massively driven by speculation,
this system is characterised by a dominance of  internationally active megabanks and large
financial conglomerates; by complex national and transnational interconnections between
banks as well as between banks and the ‘shadow banking’ world; by excessive leverage; and
by a lack of  transparency especially with regard to these opaque structures and the
underlying products and activities that reproduce them. The global financial crisis itself, as
well as numerous scandals, such as the 2010 Flash Crash, the spectacular JPMorgan’s
‘London whale trade losses’ in 2012, or the Libor manipulations, illustrated to the public
that this system and its risks cannot be managed adequately and that regulatory oversight
remains a mission impossible. Although most megabanks have returned to large profits and
so-called systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) have passed official stress tests
for which they had to increase capital buffers, problematic pre-crisis trends have continued
and partly even intensified. With a New York Times bestseller book title describing the
situation at the time of  the crash, one could argue that ‘all the devils’1 are still around or
side with Admati and Hellwig that ‘even with proposed reforms’ the emerging system ‘is as
dangerous and fragile as the system that brought us the recent crisis’.2 Moreover, the too-
big-to-fail (TBTF) institutions still profit in various ways from implicit government
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subsidies which are no longer seen as justifiable within an economic paradigm based on the
idea of  the superiority of  highly competitive markets.
Emerging parallel with the overcomplex structures a cultural change in banking
happened over recent decades that economists such as Paul Krugman or John Kay
described as one from ‘boring banking’ of  the 1950s and 1960s to a highly dynamic,
innovative and fast-growing banking system, finally culminating in an excitement in this
sector only comparable to the situation before the Wall Street Crash in 1929.3 The result is
an emerging literature and political debate on the causes and effects of  structures, cultures,
incentives, products and activities. Many have analysed modern finance as ‘casino banking’
driven by recklessness, greed, corruption, and gambling,4 by ‘mad money’,5 ‘madness with
method’,6 or ‘medieval alchemy’7 which undermines the ‘real economy’ and increases
overall inequality and instability. This system, labelled by critics as ‘casino capitalism’,8
‘financialization’9 and a ‘finance-led accumulation regime’,10 has produced numerous
national and regional crises since its emergence in the 1970s, before finally proving how
unstable, risky, destructive and costly it has become globally. However, before the global
financial crisis, mainstream actors were convinced that modern finance had become safer
thanks to deregulation, liberalisation, ‘light-touch’ regulation, business self-regulation and
sophisticated risk management practices, such as diversification via securitisation. Stricter
monetary policy, the trend towards independent central banks, and further policies
described by critics as neoliberal were seen as major improvements that had led to a ‘Great
Moderation’ with less macro-economic volatility allowing more leverage and high liquidity.11
Emerging markets and poor countries were seen as remaining sources for future financial
crises and reform proposals focused on measures that would make their regulatory systems
similar to those in the most developed countries.12
Now with the continuing global financial crisis in its various stages and multiple facets,
its aftershocks and the return of  ‘crisis economics’13 with all kind of  uncertainties and
pressures to reform the very role of  modern finance, its contemporary size, shape and
dynamics are radically put into question. Proponents of  the shareholder value paradigm
propose radical reforms to rescue this idea from its distortions caused by short-termism.14
Economists as an entire discipline have started to explain how it came to the enormous
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‘misunderstanding’ of  financial crises15 but still struggle to understand what lessons to be
drawn.16 System transformation with deleveraging and many other measures affecting the
future structures of  finance came on the agenda. Asking about the benefits of  the size,
structure and functions of  finance and demanding quite radical change, as well as thinking
about the optimum number and size of  banks, about ways to decrease interconnectedness
among firms and to improve competition, and about the overall future structures of  finance
have become not just popular among many regulators and law-makers but a key policy goal
already resulting in numerous regulatory changes and proposals.
This paper analyses the various reforms and proposals and argues that in the area of
structural reforms reformulations still remain within the overall system of  financialisation.
The adopted reforms include a number of  significant loopholes and flaws that altogether
lead to a result in which the overall dominance of  finance will persist and create continued
financial instability. By making regulatory proposals overly complex, loopholes and flaws
were increased. Additionally, institutional arrangements remain problematic. Significant
problems and uncertainties with regard to overly complex and opaque banking structures
remain. However, the overall direction of  reforms might still change in key jurisdictions and
heavy aftershocks might quickly bring more radical, yet marginalised, proposals on the
agenda. At least in theory one could assume that several reforms potentially lead to a more
significant change via gradual institutional reforms, while more radical reforms would
require much more political pressure and will. The next section will discuss why and how
structure matters and why financial structures became a problem that needs to be resolved.
Section 3 will look at various regulatory reforms and proposals addressing financial
structures with a focus on measures that affect financial institutions directly, such as most
prominently the Volcker Rule and ring-fencing. The concluding section will problematise
the regulatory space for taming finance in times of  crisis, austerity and increased public
protest potential. It will be concluded that new regulatory strategies are required that draw
the lessons from the failed radical reform proposals so far.
2 structures of finance matter
Half  a decade after the meltdown, regulators in a still highly politicised policy area are facing
great expectations and public pressure to address the structural flaws of  the current
financial system and to make the future structures more robust and resilient. Before the
crisis regulating finance was basically a rather closed expert discourse with moderate and
radical critics marginalised. The dominant paradigm shared by business and financial
markets experts and regulators included the assumption that the general trends towards
higher structural complexity within the liberalised and deregulated markets were extremely
positive and allowed unprecedented economies of  scale and scope, increasing transnational
activities, extreme leverage, and a focus on investment banking which would result in overall
benefits for societies. That the ever larger financial institutions resulting from fast capital
concentration through global competition, mergers and acquisitions would be more stable,
because such institutions would be more diversified and superior in applying new risk
measurement and management techniques, was another credo of  the time.17 Within the
European Union (EU) the demand for a highly integrated financial internal market with
several global players was another key driver for ever more complex structures. Financial
centres such as Wall Street or the City of  London, as well as offshore centres, were highly
respected and seen as positive drivers of  globalisation contributing to more growth and
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wealth across the planet. Financialisation – understood as the increased importance of
financial motives, markets, actors and institutions – would allow all social groups and every
individual to participate in this new world of  better and more democratic access to financial
products. The overall pre-crisis paradigm ignored systemic problems caused by the
increasing complexity of  structures, activities and products, extreme leverage, the increasing
interconnectedness and size of  financial institutions and reduced transparency. In particular,
calls for a global systemic risk regulator receiving broader attention in the aftermaths of  the
East-Asian financial crisis of  1997–98 were ignored. Largely overlooked were also problems
of  unfair competition derived from subsidies for TBTF institutions, or the fact that various
fast-growing markets, such as high-frequency trading or derivatives trading, were highly
concentrated giving unfair advantages to specific market players, such as megabanks, high-
frequency traders or the privileged ‘primary dealers’. It is only in the post-meltdown climate
that ever larger, more complex and more leveraged financial institutions and unregulated,
market-driven innovation are no longer uncritically accepted by key regulators but seen as
unacceptable causes for excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, and inadequate capital
requirements that altogether increase the probability of  crises and bailouts.
Given poor evidence, it is rather odd how complex and opaque structures, products and
activities and, in particular, high leverage and unregulated innovation are often presented as
absolutely superior and essential for global markets. In 2009, Paul Volcker, a former chair
of  the US Federal Reserve and an outspoken critic of  today’s financial system, polemicised
against this ideology-driven claim that the only useful innovation of  modern finance was
the automated teller machine (ATM) and that he would still await someone showing him
evidence that modern finance would actually contribute to economic growth.18 In the UK,
Adair Turner, then chair of  the now dismantled Financial Services Authority (FSA),
similarly concluded: 
There is no clear evidence that the growth in the scale and complexity of  the
financial system in the rich developed world over the last twenty to thirty years
has driven increased growth or stability, and it is possible for financial activity to
extract rents from the real economy rather than to deliver economic value.19
Martin Wolf, chief  economics commentator of  the Financial Times, repeatedly argued that
the crisis resulted from ‘an illmanaged, irresponsible, highly concentrated and
undercapitalised financial sector’ and that we have to be really radical this time as the crisis
so far brought us into a situation in which ‘the most important point is that where we are
now is intolerable’.20 Similarly, Sir Mervyn King, Governor of  the Bank of  England until
mid-2013, stated in a speech: 
Of  all the many ways of  organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today
. . . Change is . . . inevitable. The question is only whether we can think our way
through to a better outcome before the next generation is damaged by a future
and bigger crisis.21
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In short, ‘international policymakers have concluded that many of  the world’s largest banks
are not the right size’ and are now looking at ways to make banking structures more ‘robust
and resilient’.22
One of  the core questions in contemporary financial regulation reform debates is about
the best – the optimum – structure for traditional banking to reduce systemic risk and to
stop TBTF by removing any implicit or explicit government support for financial
institutions (including the shadow banking system) that creates moral hazard and the
necessity of  bailouts by the taxpayer. In a functioning market economy, failing firms are
expected to go into bankruptcy, which in turn improves the situation for the surviving
businesses – this is why Joseph Schumpeter23 described this process as ‘creative destruction’
and a key driver of  economic development. But TBTF seemed to make bailouts, state aid
and mergers a necessity that generally led to further market concentration and market
distortions. These trends have continued over the past few years. Moreover, an increase in
mergers is already expected with market consolidation in a calmer post-crisis period. In the
crisis situation, subsidies create the problem of  the so-called zombie banks and various
restrictions on legal action (‘too big to jail’) which not only undermine the functioning of
the market but also the legitimacy of  the capitalist system. Even by neoliberals these
fundamental market distortions caused by implicit or explicit government support are
understood as in urgent need of  reform.
Deleveraging and less complex, more competitive and more transparent structures are
regarded as necessary to reduce systemic risk and to design a more preventive and
precautionary financial system.24 Yet, still only a minority wants to return to boring banking,
or an even more radical overhaul of  the financial structures. Ideas to redesign finance along
the lines of  strict product and activities regulations, such as – despite several flaws – is
already the practice in drugs, food, or chemicals regulation in various regimes, did not find
broad support either. Proposals, such as learning from Islamic banking, largely unaffected
by the global crisis, were also only supported by a few. The majority of  regulators and
especially of  business representatives still hope to get away with rather moderate
adjustments. A too simple and restrictive system is by many seen as no longer adequate
given global trade levels and interconnectedness and is often associated with a loss in overall
consumer welfare. Hopes that this crisis could transform the system beyond financialisation
are counteracted by significant fears that any such an attempt would go in a wrong direction
or even that modest reforms would already go too far by creating more harms than goods,
especially in this time of  economic recovery in which finance is needed.
The question about the optimum structure is related to the insight that the industry
structure has to be transformed by regulation and not just by post-crisis market or
technology-driven processes that modify the structures of  finance too. Changing industry
structures via regulation and the right timing of  this approach are, of  course, highly
contested. It is only logical that industry opposes any changes to a system that generates
high returns and bonuses. Over recent years, there were numerous complaints from
business lobbyists that policy-makers would wrongly follow a populist demand for
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punishing bankers resulting in over-regulation with disastrous effects on the financial
sector’s contributions to economic recovery. Further concerns are that, when not in line
with international agreements, too ambitious reforms might just lead to economic
disadvantages caused by regulatory competition on globalised financial markets and that
policy-makers and regulators are limited in their actions by fears that institutions and
activities would just move to other jurisdictions in response to tough regulation. Moreover,
modest reforms are supported by contemporary regulatory practices. Opponents of  more
significant structural reforms frequently point towards high costs in such processes and
uncertainties of  measures, such as much stricter capital requirements, breaking up the
largest institutions, controlling innovation, or more transparency. Good governance
regulatory tools such as public consultations and Regulatory Impact Assessment with
Benefit-Cost Analysis are only of  a limited value in these discussions. Public consultations
are dominated by the opinions of  experts from the financial sector beside the various other
‘behind-the-door’ lobbying activities.25 Regulators are also often captured by business
interests.26 It is moreover extremely hard to calculate any possible effects of  structural
reforms over the next few decades and all proposals necessarily include a high level of
uncertainty.27 Frequently powerful lobbying groups intervened with calculations of  the high
costs of  reforms, while ignoring the significant costs of  the likely next crash and crisis.28 In
short, we not only have insufficient evidence about the benefits and costs of  the current
financial system but also about the various options for its long-term transformation, which
leaves decision-makers with a political decision about what the future of  finance should
look like and a normative decision about how much stability this will create and what
risk–risk trade-offs are acceptable. And up to now, the political will for real reforms was
mostly missing, as Admati and Hellwig lamented.29 In this climate, some observers have
concluded that there has been little real change so far. Others have started to assume that
the major decisions to shape the structures of  finance for the next few decades have been
made. For the US, Simon Johnson concluded: ‘The debate is over; the decision to cap the
size of  the largest banks has been made. All that remains is to work out the details.’30 What
kind of  decisions have been made and in what direction the reforms will go is the focus of
the next section.
3 redesigning and transforming finance
Structures of  finance can be transformed directly or indirectly and either by building on
existing regulation or by adopting new regulation. Indirect regulation affects the overall
market dynamics by correcting incentives for specific products and activities that then affect
market structures. Such price regulations are, for example, higher capital requirements or
sector-specific taxes. Direct measures aim at regulating structures of  financial institutions
via institution-specific requirements. From among the numerous reforms of  finance
adopted or proposed over the past few years, this paper will focus on proposals to change
the structure of  finance directly via structural regulation. Given the adopted measures and
proposals so far, divergence between the US and the EU, but even within EU member
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states, has become likely. However, numerous loopholes and flaws in regulations might
make the differences less important as will be argued. Moreover, there have always been
quite significant dissimilarities in the financial structures of  these jurisdictions and some
differences clearly accommodate the chosen regulatory paths. The most important ideas
with regard to becoming in some form regulatory reality are the US approach linked to the
Volcker Rule and the British/European reform proposal of  ring-fencing, as well as reforms
on orderly resolution. But there are also a number of  other, more or less marginalised
demands, such as opposition to interventions, ‘narrow banking’, limited purpose banking,
or even further nationalisations of  banks, that need to be explored given the dynamics of  a
crisis that might allow ‘radical’ proposals to become dominant. This section will discuss
these ideas with regard to their overall effects including those related to regulatory
competition, intended and unintended consequences, possible weaknesses, and flaws and
loopholes in order to ask whether any of  these proposals is radical enough to make the
financial system safer and to achieve the stated goals.
3.1 No regULatIoN of INDUstry strUctUres
One of  the major claims in this discourse is that in a situation of  high uncertainty any new
regulation would generate highly negative unintended consequences. Most neoliberals share
the belief  that governments should not intervene and try to change or design market
structures. This should be solely left to market forces, whereby one market-based solution
to deal with systemic risk might be to force firms to buy insurance against its potential
losses.31 They also argue against bailouts or more interventionist merger control and many
other measures that would affect the structures of  finance. In the current historical
situation, without a quick recovery and a return to pre-crisis conditions, the non-
intervention demand is damned to remain ideology as neither firms nor regulators were
highly supportive of  radical market-based solutions. The argument with regard to structural
reforms has therefore slightly shifted to emphasising that banking regulation has already
been strongly strengthened via Basel III (still in need of  fine-tuning and implementation)
and that market-driven and corporate governance reforms have already brought significant
changes in behaviour that all together will make banks safe enough. Structural reforms are
now ‘untimely’ and would only harm economic recovery. Moreover, many bankers have
claimed that structural reforms always pose assessment problems and would necessarily lead
to negative unintended consequences. In the UK, they have emphasised that it would not
have been the largest institutions that got into trouble and mega-size would not
automatically translate into excessive risk. Similarly, in the US JPMorgan Chase was an
often-used example of  a big institution getting through the crisis without serious problems
and its chief  executive officer Jamie Dimon became the most prominent opponent against
reform calls. However, how well such institutions performed during the crisis is not relevant
for the question of  how they contribute to a too high systemic risk level. Also regulators are
looking at this issue and have concluded that size of  the balance sheet alone is an
insufficient indicator to capture problems related to more complex interconnections.32
In the US, Mitt Romney’s defeat in the 2012 presidential elections ensured that structural
reforms adopted with the Dodd-Frank Act 2010 will not be achieved for at least another
four years. However, Republicans were successful in blocking proposals that regulators get
sufficient funding for implementing reforms and worked actively towards delaying
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implementation. In the EU, where reforms have been slowed down because of  the
Eurozone crisis, the general acceptance for structural reforms is not necessarily higher with
the UK highly concerned about the overall future competitiveness of  London and with
Germany and France also interested in improving their competitive position in global
finance. With the European crisis, market-driven developments led to decreased
transnational activities of  banks and to problems meeting stricter capital requirements.
Nevertheless, all the above-mentioned countries have put forward direct regulations
affecting the future structures of  finance. For Europe one could, of  course, argue that a
non-intervention position has already been strengthened over the past years with the
‘modernisation’ of  European competition law and policy that brought the European
approach closer to the Chicago School theory and away from interventions into markets in
favour of  deepening integration. Competition law is powerful and in its neoliberal
interpretation on both sides of  the Atlantic superior to other public policy goals. In the EU
the unique state aid policy assures, moreover, that any state aid requires strict restructuring
obligations.33 Beyond the rather limited state aid policies, the framework largely favours
non-intervention into the market mechanism. But, for now, the US is implementing the
Volcker Rule, incorporated into the Dodd-Frank Act, and the EU Commission and the UK
proposed ring-fencing as most important structural reforms, whereby the EU approach is
more similar to the Volcker Rule and has recently been adopted by Germany in a new
Banking Separation Act.34
3.2 from gLass-steagaLL to tHe VoLcker rULe
In the early 1930s climate of  political and economic turmoil in the US, a debate had started
about separating commercial and investment banking. President Hoover and Senator Carter
Glass became advocates of  this idea, sharing the analysis that this would solve problems
that led to the stock market crash by eliminating various conflicts of  interests and high-risk
speculative lending practices. Representative Henry B Steagall was an advocate of  deposit
insurance to make banks safer. The reform proposals were finally also accepted by
investment and commercial banks that saw at least temporary advantages in the final
proposals.35 The Banking Act of  1933, often referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act, was then
the law establishing federal deposit insurance and various restrictions on speculation and
splitting investment and commercial banking. Glass-Steagall’s original intention was to bring
all commercial banks under the Federal Reserve System and to establish strict restrictions
on speculation. However, thanks to loopholes, a large number of  state chartered banks
remained outside this system, putting them also outside the restrictions on purchasing and
selling securities. From the 1960s, the restrictions were already being interpreted less strictly
and commercial banks were more and more allowed to engage in securities activities and,
since the 1980s, investment banks have increased their engagement in thrifts or state
chartered banks, avoiding Glass-Steagall affiliation restrictions and holding company laws.
It nevertheless took until 1999, when under President Bill Clinton the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act was adopted that removed the remaining barriers for commercial banks to engage in
investment banking or to merge with insurance companies. The Glass-Steagall provisions
against conflicts of  interest were no longer seen as adequate regulation in modern financial
markets but as unnecessary restrictions reducing market efficiency and liquidity and putting
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US banks into competitive disadvantage. However, there were also early warnings that
Gramm-Leach-Bliley would go too far and increase the TBTF problem.36 But it was only
in the aftermath of  the financial meltdown that claims became widely popular that repealing
Glass-Steagall was a major cause of  the financial crisis and that commercial and investment
banking should be split again. Only a few have argued for reintroducing Glass-Steagall and
the dominant approach became a moderate reformulation under the label ‘Volcker Rule’.
The Volcker Rule, named after Paul A Volcker, a former Federal Reserve chair from
1979 to 1987 who championed the idea of  breaking up the largest banks and prohibiting
deposit-taking institutions from engaging in certain forms of  risky activities, will restrict
banks from speculating with federally insured deposits. More specifically, the rule prohibits
bank holding companies from owning, investing in or sponsoring hedge funds or private
equity funds and from engaging in proprietary trading. Volcker regards this measure as key
‘in the interest of  fair and open competition as well as protecting the provision of  essential
financial services’.37 This rule became a prominent cornerstone of  US regulatory debates.
President Obama proposed it in January 2010 as an integral part of  the financial regulatory
overhaul.38 A House–Senate conference committee then approved the rule in June 2010.39
Originally, Volcker outlined the rule ‘in a three-page letter to the president’. In 2010,
when the Dodd-Frank Act ‘went to Congress, the Volcker Rule that it contained took up 10
pages’; in its public consultation version in October 2011 it was 298 pages, ‘accompanied by
more than 1,300 questions about 400 topics’.40
The Dodd-Frank Act sets out the Volcker Rule in s 619. The proprietary trading
provisions in the Act prohibit:
a banking entity or nonbank financial company supervised by the Board’ from
trading activity in which it acts as a principal (principal investments) for its own
trading account ‘in any transaction to purchase or sell, or otherwise acquire or
dispose of, any security, any derivative, any contract of  sale of  a commodity for
future delivery, any option on any such security, derivative or contract, or any
other security or financial instrument that the appropriate federal banking
agencies, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) may, by rule as provided in
subsection (b)(2), determine.
The hedge fund and private equity fund provisions generally prohibit deposit-taking
institutions to ‘acquire or retain any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or
sponsor a hedge fund or a private equity fund’.41
The Volcker Rule version in the Dodd-Frank Act was watered down compared to earlier
formulations and included several exemptions. Although the rule bans banks from short-
term trading of  securities for their own account and limits investments in private equity
groups and hedge funds, the restrictions allow a number of  exemptions that have been
defined as ‘permitted activities’ and longer-term commitments or ‘principal investments’.
These activities include ‘hedging’, ‘market-making’, asset management, underwriting, and
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other transactions on behalf  of  customers. The line between these activities and purely
speculative activities is highly flawed. For this reason Dodd-Frank is sometimes also labelled
‘Glass-Steagall lite’.
The Dodd-Frank Act demanded the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to
study the implementation of  the Volcker Rule and to make corresponding
recommendations ‘not later than 6 months after the date of  enactment’. The FSOC
published its report in September 2011.42 All the details of  the rule’s implementation were
left by Dodd-Frank to the regulatory authorities (SEC, CFTC, Office of  the Comptroller of
the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Board of  Governors of  the
Federal Reserve System). The agencies would have been required to adopt implementation
rules not later than nine months after the Financial Stability Oversight Council’s study’s
completion. However, decision-making was slowed down by massive lobbying interventions
and highly technical consultations. Critics insisting on a strict implementation were more
and more marginalised between 2010 and 2012. The Republicans openly demanded
dropping the Volcker Rule completely as part of  their demand for reversing Dodd-Frank’s
over-regulation. Republicans argued in particular that the Volcker Rule would put US banks
into clear competitive disadvantages on the global market.43 They fought against a strict
implementation in the US congressional bank oversight panel and by threats to block or
reduce budgets for the agencies that will have to implement the Volcker Rule.
The final version was still delayed when, in May 2012, JPMorgan Chase had to disclose
a $2 billion trading loss (later turning out to be an at least $6.2 billion loss)44 that was
broadly interpreted as strong evidence for the lack of  change at Wall Street banks and their
ongoing gambling that could only give advocates of  a stricter implementation of  the
Volcker Rule a massive boost. In particular JPMorgan’s loss led to debates about how this
rule would have had an impact on such deals, had it already been in force, although
JPMorgan did not release any details behind the trade. However, the flawed interpretations
of  hedging and market-making still allowing high-risk speculation and the consequences
from weakening implementation gained attention. The FSOC had already emphasised the
importance of  reviewing ‘permitted activities’ closely and to implement a ‘programmatic
compliance regime’ that would need to be ‘designed to ensure that proprietary trading does
not migrate into permitted activities’.45 But with the JPMorgan loss scandal, demonstrating
poor risk management in the top bank and the success of  the large banks in interpreting
‘hedging’ and ‘market-making’ to their advantage, stricter implementation became at least
for the moment more likely. The timing of  this debacle was perfect for advocates as the
final version of  the Volcker Rule was expected by the summer or at least by early fall. This
was an example of  how business power, regulatory capture and regulatory competition
pressures can become weaker under conditions of  crisis, when the capacity for gradual
institutional change exists. However, it is also an example of  how the financial regulation
elite still do not bother about huge profits coming from the same risky activities, but are
surprised if  things go wrong.
Compared to Glass-Steagall, the Volcker Rule is overly detailed and complex. Luigi
Zingales became one of  the few advocates for Glass-Steagall arguing that it is superior
thanks to its simplicity and necessary for ‘a well regulated and transparent public market’: 
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The Glass-Steagall Act was just 37 pages long. The so-called Volcker rule has
been transformed into 298 pages of  mumbo jumbo, which will require armies of
lawyers to interpret. The simpler a rule is, the fewer provisions there are and the
less it costs to enforce them. The simpler it is, the easier it is for voters to
understand and voice their opinions accordingly. Finally, the simpler it is, the
more difficult it is for someone with vested interests to get away with distorting
some obscure facet.
In Zingales’ view, ‘Glass-Steagall helped restrain the political power of  banks’ and was an
important law against ‘excessive power.’46 With the Glass-Steagall, provisions investment
banks, commercial banks and insurance companies would have different interests and
agendas that would limit their overall power by off-setting one another.
Overall the highly controversial US debate reflects the huge uncertainties with regard to
direct regulations that will shape the future of  finance and that the current policy is not
going beyond financialisation.
3.3 rINg-feNcINg
While the Volcker Rule is very much embedded in the US regulatory culture and memory
of  Glass-Steagall and in a strong antitrust policy concern against TBTF institutions, the idea
gained much less support in Europe, where many countries have no history of  a separation
between retail and investment banking but extensive experience with universal banking.
Inspired by a study by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,47
this led to proposals focusing on ring-fencing certain business areas by the UK Independent
Commission on Banking (ICB) and by the European Commission’s High-level Expert
Group on reforming the structure of  the EU banking sector.
In the UK, the Volcker Rule has mostly been criticised as the wrong approach. The
largest banks argued that the crisis would not show a clear relationship between bank size
and activities but only a relationship between good and bad risk management practices.
Deposit-taking institutions engaged in propriety trading and investing in hedge funds and
private equity groups would provide useful services. The governments supported this view.
Before forming a Coalition government, many Conservatives and Liberals were more
critical about banking structures. George Osborne, then Shadow Chancellor, called for a
sector with smaller banks. While former Prime Minister Gordon Brown rejected a ‘rigid
divide’ of  banks along a Glass-Steagall approach, Osborne argued that British banks had
become TBTF and too big to be bailed out.48 However, the Conservatives did not want to
position themselves too early with precise plans. Their manifesto for the 2010 general
election announced that they would ‘pursue international agreement to prevent retail banks
from engaging in activities, such as large-scale proprietary trading, that put the stability of
the system at risk’. The Liberal Party, especially Vince Cable, called for a total separation of
the retail banks from ‘casino’ investment banks. The coalition agreement between the
Conservatives and Liberals, released on 12 May 2010, promised ‘detailed proposals to foster
diversity, promote mutuals and create a more competitive banking industry’. In order ‘to
reduce systemic risk in the banking system’ they announced that they would ‘establish an
independent commission to investigate the complex issue of  separating retail and
investment banking in a sustainable way’ within one year. On 16 June 2010, Chancellor
Osborne announced the creation of  this ICB chaired by Sir John Vickers.
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The ICB was a rather small commission, with two out of  five members having had past
or continued clear affiliation with financial firms. After taking up work, the ICB released an
‘issue paper: call for evidence’ in September 2010 that discussed a number of  issues such as
financial stability, competition, economic recovery and lending, competitiveness, and risks
to the government’s fiscal position, and presented reform options for consultation. The
latter included options related to the structure of  banks. These included the ‘separation of
retail and investment banking’, à la Glass-Steagall, ‘narrow banking and limited purpose
banking’, ‘limits on proprietary trading and investing’ in line with the Dodd-Frank Act’s
Volcker Rule, the degree of  separation, structural separability, contingent capital, and
structure-related surcharges. With regard to the structure of  financial markets the ICB
considered ‘measures to reduce concentration’ related to merger law and a market
infrastructure reform with the goal of  increased transparency. Against a Volcker Rule type
of  limits on proprietary trading and investing, the ICB argued that:
there is the practical question of  how to tell the difference between proprietary
trading on the one hand, and risk-reducing hedging or market-making on the
other. For example, a bank might acquire a large position in interest rate swaps
for speculative reasons or, by contrast, to hedge interest rate risk naturally arising
from the maturity transformation of  ordinary commercial banking business.49
The ICB then accepted the arguments against a break-up of  TBTF banks and proposed
alternatively the idea of  ring-fencing to protect retail banking from the investment banking
divisions.50 Banks would have to put their high-street banking in a separate legal subsidiary
with higher capital requirements and an independent board. Instead of  a total separation of
retail and investment banking: both subsidiaries could remain under a common parent
holding company. Banks would have some flexibility to decide what is inside and outside
the higher protected retail part. The proposals should be implemented by 2019.
In total, the IBC believes that: ‘Ring-fenced banks would be simpler, less connected and
easier to resolve without taxpayer support than existing universal banks.’51
While the UK government supported the idea, ring-fencing has also been heavily
criticised. The director-general of  the Confederation of  British Industry called it, in a
Financial Times interview, ‘barking mad’.52 Industry and lobbyists have argued that ring-
fencing would lead to banks becoming uncompetitive and harm the chances of  a recovery.
Others called for high flexibility to ensure that the UK banks would not become
uncompetitive against global competitors or argued that Basel III rules would be much
more significant.53 There was also some concern in the financial press over whether ring-
fencing could work in practice.
After the Queen’s Speech in May 2012 confirmed that the government would go ahead
with the controversial measures within a Banking Reform Bill,54 banks warned that plans to
ring-fence would be too expensive and the costs would be passed on to businesses and
household customers.55 As a next step, the Treasury and the Department for Business,
Innovation and Skills presented a White Paper entitled Banking Reform: Delivering Stability and
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Supporting a Sustainable Economy that opened the next round of  public consultation. Besides
setting out the context of  the reforms, the White Paper discusses ring-fencing, loss-
absorbency and competition in separate chapters. It also presents in the annex an impact
assessment comparing the benefits and costs of  the Coalition government’s implementation
plan of  the IBC recommendations with a reference policy option of  non-action.
Vickers criticised the government saying that the proposal would not go far enough and
fall short of  fully implementing the recommendations of  the IBC, especially watering down
the limits on the leverage of  big banks.56
Throughout the debates initiated by the establishment of  an IBC and the consultation
processes on an initial call for evidence and then on the interim report, there were warnings
that the UK should not adopt any approach unilaterally but ‘should lead a global debate on
structural reform’.57 Industry was generally in opposition of  any limits on proprietary
trading and investing, arguing for market efficiency and the need for hedging and market-
making.58 Barclays59 argued that there would not be any evidence suggesting ‘that structural
change would enhance financial stability’, the costs for structural change would be too high
and implementation uncertain. Structural changes with regard to diversity of  business
models, size and types of  banks should be left to the market and the institutions themselves.
Any changes should conform to international reforms with regard to scope and timeline.
The British Bankers Association (BBA)60 defended universal banks, emphasising their key
role in economic recovery. Moreover, the BBA warned ‘that separately devised national
measures or international measures introduced on a super-equivalent basis in the UK will
not only have the potential to be detrimental to the UK’s attractiveness as a financial centre,
but also be damaging to the economic future of  the UK’. HSBC61 advocated the universal
banking model as ‘best placed to meet 21st century needs’. Moreover they would be ‘more
stable’ than other forms of  banks. In summary these arguments are the pre-crisis arguments
claiming advantages of  financialisation.
Following the interim report and the final report, industry remained concerned about
the ICB’s ring-fencing proposal. Critique included the argument that it would be too costly
with a negative impact on recovery, that it would increase the stress on the unprotected
entity in times of  crisis,62 or that ring-fencing should not be designed in a way that it has
impacts on any of  the current ‘standard banking services demanded by their individual and
business customers of  any size’.63 The BBA has also been concerned about ring-fencing
and demanded much more evidence and research on ‘the effect of  such a proposal on
financial stability under different economic scenarios’ as well as ‘the consequences for the
internationality of  the UK as a financial centre should such a proposal proceed.’64
This is all evidence of  a weakened banking industry. However, Angela Knight, chief
executive of  the BBA, eventually welcomed the banking reform White Paper stating that it
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‘balances the need to establish a banking system which is more certain and more secure with
the ability of  banks to continue to provide the full range of  services to customers and
support to the economy’. The BBA especially welcomed ‘the refinements to the original
proposal’, which in total would ‘have removed many of  the obstacles from the original
[ICB] report’. Although ‘the costs to the banks’ would still be ‘substantial’, Knight no longer
saw a risk for the provision of  services or the City’s international position.65
Since then the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards has concluded that the
ring-fence proposals are insufficient, because there would not be sufficient precautions to
ensure that the ring-fence does not get holes over time via lobbying and political
interventions. The Parliamentary Commission therefore suggested ‘electrification’ of  the
ring-fence. The regulator would need strong powers to enforce separation of  institutions if
they do not meet strict ring-fence requirements. This would also require periodic reviews of
the sector, and over time even tougher measures might be required. As next task the
Parliamentary Commission wanted to look into full separation of  proprietary trading along
the Volcker Rule line.66 These proposals go in an interesting direction from the perspective
of  gradual institutional change and address typical problems of  financial reforms becoming
less strict in implementation and enforcement over time.
A slightly different approach to ring-fencing comes from the EU’s High-level Expert
Group on reforming the structure of  the EU banking sector. The group was set up by
Commissioner Michel Barnier in November 2011 to assess the need for bank structural
reforms and it was chaired by Erkki Liikanen, Governor of  the Bank of  Finland. The group
held a consultation in May 2012 to which mostly banks and bank associations but also
Finance Watch, Friends of  the Earth Europe, and Transparency International responded.
Contributions from megabanks were largely missing. The group’s final report, released on
2 October 2012, proposed a mandatory separation of  certain trading-related activities
(above a specific threshold) which would require banking groups to organise certain
businesses into a separate legal entity that must be separately capitalised and must not be
funded by insured deposits.67 In contrast to the ICB position, the idea here is to ring-fence
the investment banking arm with the trading and market-making arms.
The Liikanen Report was welcomed by Commissioner Barnier and was put out for a six-
week consultation. Among first reactions, industry representatives welcomed that the report
did not put into question the universal banking model. But the hybrid between Volcker and
Vickers was also seen as problematic by many industry representatives. Some argued that
this reform could damage the flow of  corporate funding in Europe.68 The next months will
show reactions to the report and what will be translated into new regulations. In the
meantime, this approach has been followed by Germany. The German Banking Separation
Act, to be implemented by mid-2015, has, however, similar exemptions to the Dodd-Frank
Act with regard to market-making and dealing on behalf  of  customers. The German
approach might guide the direction for other countries with a strong universal banking
tradition. In summary, the developments on ring-fencing led to policies to modify the
existing structures only moderately and to keep important loopholes that do not undermine
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the dominance of  financialisation. Loopholes and flaws are similar to the US approach and
can be explained by massive business pressure and fears about competitive disadvantages.
3.4 Narrow BaNkINg
A third proposal to end bailouts of  financial institutions is narrow banking. This idea has
its origins in the US where it was previously considered in the 1930s. It is based on the belief
that the fractional reserve banking system would have significant problems and weaknesses
and that it would only work in normal times. Whenever faced with extraordinary demand
for cash, banks would necessarily face bank runs, break down or require bailouts. In the
1930s, economists at the University of  Chicago proposed the ‘Chicago Plan’ and Yale
economist Irving Fisher suggested a ‘100 percent money’ system.69 The core idea of  these
proposals was to split the banking system into a protected commercial banking system and
a risky investment banking system. Milton Friedman also became an advocate of  narrow
banking when he updated the Chicago Plan.70 Since then, narrow banking has remained a
topic that again and again gained some attention. In the 1980s, Robert Litan of  the
Brookings Institution proposed narrow banking to deal with moral hazard.71 His idea was
to create monetary service companies that would only hold safe assets. Ronnie Philips
discussed not just the advantages of  narrow banking but also engaged with critics.72
Another important study was an International Monetary Fund working paper entitled
‘Should Banks Be Narrowed?’ that argued that narrow banking would result in ‘less than
certain benefits in terms of  greater financial stability, while it would exact some heavy costs
in terms of  efficiency and credit availability’.73
Now, in the aftermath of  the financial meltdown, narrow banking has again found some
wider support. Phillips and Roselli proposed narrow banking for the US.74 John Kay, a
Scottish economist, professor at the London School of  Economics and Financial Times
columnist, is the strongest supporter of  narrow banking in the UK. According to Kay, the
purpose of  narrow banking ‘is to protect the non-financial sector as far as possible from
the consequences of  failures and instability within the financial sector’. This would only be
possible by a complete separation of  ‘the casino from the utility’.75
Advocates of  narrow banking share the belief  that better or more regulation will not
prevent financial institutions from excessive risk-taking. Supervision would be the wrong
approach and narrow banking would require only limited regulation. Kay, for example,
stated that the principles should be ‘competition where possible, regulation where necessary,
and supervision not at all’.76 This distaste of  supervision comes from the belief  that it is
necessarily resulting in regulatory capture.77
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The idea of  narrow banking found little support in regulatory reforms. It was
nevertheless discussed in financial media, several economists expressed sympathies and also
the UK ICB looked into it and asked for comments from stakeholders. In its 2010 ‘issue
paper’ the ICB framed the debate with several concerns against narrow banking, such as lost
synergy effects between deposit-taking and bank lending activities, a ‘tying up’ of  ‘banking
deposits in government bonds’ instead of  making them ‘available to fund productive
investment through financial intermediation’. Moreover, narrow banking would not end the
possibility and need for bailouts.78 In the final report, the ICB argued that narrow banking
‘would dramatically reduce the range of  intermediation possibilities’ and that ‘ring-fencing
would be less costly’.79 Kay himself  discusses and rejects a number of  critiques such as the
claim that the world would need big banks, that big banks would be superior because of  their
ability to reduce risks by diversification, or that corporate customers would demand universal
banking. He also opposed the claim that the unilateral introduction of  narrow banking would
result in competitive disadvantages. He also argues that ‘living wills’ and a proper resolution
regime for insolvent banks would require ‘radical restructuring and simplification of  the
corporate structures of  financial conglomerates’, resulting in narrow banking.80
However, throughout the ICB consultations there was no big support for narrow
banking. HSBC dealt with narrow banking in an annex and claimed that it ‘would be a
retrograde step’ and that it would be ‘a primitive and costly model that would cause the cost
of  lending to rise significantly’. The concept would also ignore the market demand for
‘more sophisticated products’. As a result, the corresponding risk of  such products would
simply shift ‘somewhere else in the system’.81 In short, narrow banking is an idea that would
lead to a radical transformation of  banking but which would require a radicalisation in the
overall political debates for realisation. Then it would still compete with other radical ideas.
3.5 LImIteD PUrPose BaNkINg
Another radical minority demand to end casino banking is the introduction of  limited
purpose banking. Here the argument is that narrow banking would not go far enough and
would still invite ‘all the problems of  shadow banking’ but that there would be a very simple
way of  making the banking system safe and ending financial collapse and contagion by
transforming the system in line with the experience with mutual funds. Laurence Kotlikoff,
professor of  economics at Boston University, advocates the idea.82 He argued in an open
letter to Sir John Vickers, published in the Financial Times that:
Under Limited Purpose Banking, there are no incorporated shadow banks
because all incorporated financial companies, whether they call themselves
commercial banks, investment banks, hedge funds, SIVs, insurance companies,
etc., are forced to operate in one way only – as mutual fund companies, which
issue mutual funds with absolutely zero leverage, including no short positions.83
Financial companies would need to decide whether they operate with limited or unlimited
liability. Under limited liability, firms would operate ‘as 100 per cent equity-financed mutual
funds’ and they would only be allowed to engage in activities that do not involve leverage.
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As their purpose is limited to financial intermediation, risk-taking shifts from the companies
to individuals.
Kotlikoff  assumes significant consequences of  such a change, including the
disappearance of  shadow banking and risky speculation of  firms with unlimited liability
when ‘the ‘brilliant’ titans of  Wall Street who produced the financial debacle’ would have to
fear losing ‘their homes, villas, yachts, Austin Martins, etc’.84 He also claims that a mutual
funds system could never fail and that such institutions would only act, as intermediaries as
kind of  ‘honest middle men’. In his view, the problem of  modern finance is not about
complex financial products but about systemic large-scale, multifaceted fraud and lack of
information disclosure. These problems could be overcome by limited purpose banking and
a federal regulator assuring strict control and full, real-time information disclosure. This
new federal regulator he labels Federal Financial Authority (FFA) and is designed similar to
the US Food and Drug Administration. The FFA would rate financial securities, the safety
of  investment banks, insurance companies, hedge funds and commercial banks.85
Limited purpose banking was also a topic in the UK ICB consultations. The 2010 issue
paper stated that this alternative ‘is open to some of  the same criticism as narrow banking’,
that it would be too costly and that participating households would be negatively affected
by the increase of  illiquid assets. HSBC argued that the already existing limited purpose
banking would show that it ‘depends on the existence of  a modern banking system’:
‘Without banks to originate the loans, package them into securities and distribute them to
mutual funds, “limited purpose banking” could not take place’. Moreover, HSBC recalled
weaknesses of  money market mutual funds that had come to light over recent years and
been addressed by the Dodd-Frank Act.86 In short, this is another idea that would require
a completely different situation to gain more attention and will definitely not come via any
form of  gradual change.
3.6 NatIoNaLIsatIoN of BaNks aND DemocratIc coNtroL
Over the past few years quite a number of  troubled banks have had to be nationalised.
Politicians were more than keen to emphasise that this was an extraordinary and temporary
measure that should not be perceived as going back to pre-1970s state industries
approaches. Nationalisation was the emergency step in a situation in which no private
investor was willing to take over the risk. Alan Greenspan, for example, argued ‘that once
in a hundred years this is what you do’.87 State actors underlined that the nationalised banks
should be privatised as soon as the possible. Since then a debate has started over whether
the state should use this new situation to gain a maximum return by keeping them much
longer as state property or by using them as examples for transforming banking in a broader
societal public interest direction. Additionally to nationalisations, massive debts of  the
private sector have been socialised and transformed into public debt. Some commentators,
such as Martin Wolf, have argued that all the bailouts have already abolished the
state–private divide and made banking strongly linked to the state which would legitimise
the state to intervene much more aggressively. The most radical proposal, however, is the
nationalisation – or better socialisation – of  banks and putting them under democratic
control. This is a demand, by some in the Occupy and labour movements and by Marxists,
that signifies a major transition of  existing varieties of  capitalism and is normally linked
with a less evolutionary and more revolutionary socialist or communist transitional
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programme. But environmentalists have also been arguing for societal control over banking
to incorporate sustainability principles. Historically, Marx and Engels called for
‘centralisation of  money and credit in the hands of  the state, by means of  a national bank
with state capital and an exclusive monopoly’, meaning ‘the suppression of  all private banks
and bankers’. This measure was supposed ‘to regulate the credit system in the interest of
the people as a whole’ and to ‘undermine the dominion of  the big financial magnates’.88 The
demand was then a key aspect in the Bolshevik programme formulated in Lenin’s April
Theses and in his brochure on ‘the impending catastrophe and how to combat it’, both from
1917. The April Theses called for the ‘immediate union of  all banks in the country into a
single national bank, and the institution of  control over it by the Soviet of  Workers’
Deputies’.89 In the ‘impending catastrophe’, Lenin argued that the nationalisation of  banks
and their concentration into a single state bank is the only measure allowing a democratic
control over finance given its complexity and the various accounting tricks. It would allow
for the possibility ‘to regulate economic life’ and allow economic development without ‘sky-
high’ profits for bankers. ‘Banks nowadays’, he stated, ‘are so closely and intimately bound
up with trade (in grain and everything else) and with industry that without “laying hands”
on the banks nothing of  any value, nothing “revolutionary-democratic”, can be
accomplished’.90
The nationalisation of  banks and their transformation into a single state bank was seen
as an easy task to be achieved by a simple degree and ‘carried out by the directors and
employees themselves’. Bankers resisting this change ‘would lose their highly remunerative
posts and the opportunity of  performing highly profitable fraudulent operations’. It would
also be necessary to confiscate their property and to imprison bankers, board members and
big shareholders if  they tried ‘to conceal documents and accounts’. According to this
transition programme, there would still be a market and the new banking structure would
provide ‘credit on easy terms for the small owners’ and ‘for the peasants’.91
It is obvious why such a programme should become to a certain extent popular again in
a situation of  deep economic crisis with high unemployment and unpopularity of  bankers
and why nationalisation and democratic control could at least theoretically be seen as
necessary for a policy in the interests of  the majority. Of  course, proponents have drawn
lessons from banking in eastern European countries under Soviet influence. Trotskyists still
argue in line with Lenin and the debates of  the early 1920s for a state monopoly under
democratic workers’ control. Other left-wing groups no longer call for a state monopoly
and some have even wondered if  the property question is relevant at all in a modern context
and if  democratic control could actually  be achieved over private banks.
Nationalisation and democratic control have been demanded by a number of
organisations, such as very small left-wing groups, but also more influential ones such as
Attac, the Occupy movement, or Die Linke (The Left) in Germany. Sarah Wagenknecht,
representing the Marxist wing within The Left, has argued for these demands over the last
few years since she got involved in the regulatory reform debates within the European
Parliament and gained some wider public attention in the German discourse. The party
programme, adopted in 2011, very much follows her earlier line by calling for ‘a banking
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system with three pillars: savings banks, cooperative banks and large state banks’. ‘A
functioning financial sector’, the programme continues, ‘is a public good, so providing it is
a public task.’ Banks should be mandated to follow ‘social and ecological guidelines’ and ‘to
serve the public weal’. In their governance structures they should moreover incorporate
‘guaranteed strong codetermination rights as a corrective to management decisions’. Direct
citizens’ involvement is proposed with regard to ‘the development of  municipal services’.
Public property of  the large banks would assure a ‘new economic management’ and political
priority setting. ‘Private banks must . . . be nationalized, subjected to democratic control and
made to serve the public weal.’ The ‘public service mission’ must be protected by ‘strict
regulation’. Investment banking must ‘be phased out, it must be forbidden for banks to
trade in securities for their own account and to speculate in derivatives, as well as to transact
any business outside of  their own balance and to have any dealings with companies or
persons legally registered in tax havens’. Hedge funds and private equity firms should be
banned, capital controls reintroduced and various speculative products banned.92
All these proposals are not elaborated in any detail with regard to how ‘democratic
control’ or ‘workers’ control’ should work. However, they raise a question that addresses
how practices and activities of  finance could be brought into line with a wider public
interest. They also take into account that financial stability and many activities banks should
provide are public and no longer private. It goes without saying that these proposals have
not been taken up by any regulators and that they are marginalised views. But, even from a
less radical perspective, there are a number of  lessons to be drawn from the nationalisations
of  the crisis years so far, especially with regard to repeated bailouts. Regulators need to be
better prepared for nationalisations and must take much stricter requirements into account
before they nationalise a bank. This is a debate that is still largely underdeveloped in the
current turmoil and preoccupation with crisis management. A complete socialisation of
banks and democratic control, however, would definitely require a revolution or an
enormous shock such as a break-up of  the Eurozone or another massive aftershock; this
could not possibly come into existence via gradual institutional reforms.
3.7 recoVery aND resoLUtIoN PLaNs
More prominently on the agenda are demands for the orderly resolution of  failing
institutions. The regulatory reforms adopted or discussed so far have focused on unwinding
‘SIFIs and ‘globally systemically important banks’ (G-SIBs) via so-called living wills, funeral
plans and orderly resolution systems. This policy is a reaction to the lesson that the current
system with all the interconnectedness and complexity makes it nearly impossible to let
failing banks go bankrupt. In short, it tries to end the TBTF and ‘too-interconnected-to-
fail’ problem and the survival of  highly undercapitalised ‘zombie banks’. The core ideas
were agreed on at G20 level, the Financial Stability Board provided guidance, and the policy
has now to be implemented. The US adopted this approach in the Dodd-Frank Act (Title
I, s 165(d)) and has already started implementation. A first group of  megabanks had to
submit their funeral plans by mid-2012, with a second group following by mid-2013.
The EU is lagging behind and plans have been delayed due to the crisis at member-state
level as well as in Brussels. The European Commission presented a proposal in June 201293
that is now being debated.
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There are several serious problems with these approaches. Firstly, they require
frequently updated public and confidential reports with the latter only being seen by the
regulatory authorities. The overall soundness and effectiveness rests with the quality of  the
confidential reports and the willingness of  regulatory authorities to enforce a strict policy.
Given the historic experiences with regulatory capture and foreseeable problems of  strict
implementation in good times, the current designs are not very promising. Insiders from the
US have argued that the initial experience is rather disappointing and that the banks’ living
wills were not of  a high standard. This might change via gradual institutional reforms and
learning processes over time. Secondly, there are serious doubts about how living wills
would actually work in a crisis and whether this might increase capital concentration.94
Thirdly, there are doubts if  the idea works at all as long as all the banks are so
interconnected.95 Yet there is also the problem of  US regulators being able to shut down
smaller institutions but not the larger megabanks because Dodd-Frank only applies in the
US and does not cover cross-border operations.96 In short, there are still many problems to
be solved with regard to the orderly resolution of  failing banks.
4 conclusion
This paper discussed why structural reforms of  finance became so prominent with the
global financial crisis and why structures need to be changed. The adopted regulatory
reforms with a direct effect on financial structures that have been analysed have introduced
significant changes, which, however, will not transform the current system of
financialisation. They have, of  course, to be seen in the context of  the wider reforms that
are taking place, especially indirect regulation affecting the structures of  finance or product
regulations that were beyond the focus of  this paper. What can be learned from direct
regulation is that overly complex rules were created with the purpose of  generating flaws
and loopholes that do not undermine the dominance of  finance created by overly complex
and interconnected sectoral structures. Foremost, these rules made the divergence between
the US, with the adoption of  the Volcker Rule, and the UK and the EU, with their
proposals for ring-fencing systems, less significant by ensuring no threat to competitive
advantages in the corresponding domestic systems. It is still too early to anticipate the
overall effects the reforms will generate on regulatory competition in the long run and in
particular on the financial centres’ futures. What is already clear, however, is that the
complexity of  the regulatory reforms allows for a number of  problematic aspects and
trends to continue. The policy window for a radical system overhaul has not been used so
far. Complexity and uncertainties as well as highly technical legal debates and existing
regulatory governance practices give moderate reform proposals an advantage and leave
radical left proposals marginalised. The contemporary practice of  the better law-making
approach with stakeholder consultations and impact assessments made it easy to adopt
only proposals reflecting dominant powers and interests. The framing of  such processes
as well as the difficulties in calculating long-term effects of  reform proposals and the lack
of  corresponding studies were identified as essential in several debates. A radical overhaul
of  financialisation is difficult to achieve without more public pressure and stronger
countervailing powers. Aftershocks or the next level of  the crisis could easily bring more
radical proposals onto the agenda. These more radical regulatory ideas are not all new but
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build on longer traditions as shown. They have been adopted and modified to new
situations over time. Nevertheless, they are mostly still underdeveloped and lack clear
transformative strategies that could make them reality. Some ideas like narrow banking or
limited purpose banking are more of  a minor expert discourse, while nationalisation seems
to be a more natural response driven by different motivations in specific situations that
could quickly spread. Most influential on actual reforms were, however, warnings against
over-regulation and ideas about structures mainly created by market developments. Given
the strong pressures from industry in the overall climate of  crisis management and
recovery, it is a success that the adopted structural reforms are at least making the overall
system more preventive compared to the pre-crisis system. Whether gradual institutional
reforms will improve institutional arrangements and whether strict implementation and
enforcement can be ensured over time is still uncertain and will need close attention by
regulators and researchers.
Beyond financialisation? 275

